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We analyse the steady−state equilibrium dynamics of an OLG economy with a
pay−as−you−go (PAYG) pension scheme that relates old−age pensions to previous earnings.
Contrary to an economy where PAYG pensions depend on the earnings of those currently
working, such an economy may experience complex equilibrium dynamics with endogenous
cycles and bifurcations.
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The deﬁning property of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, namely that total pen-
sion payouts in any period equal the sum of contributions raised in that period, is con-
sistent with a large variety of schemes. In this paper we distinguish two beneﬁt rules or,
which is the same here, two policies to keep the PAYG budget intact when ﬂuctuations
in revenues or payouts of the scheme occur. In one setting, pensioners receive old-age
incomes as a given fraction (called replacement ratio) of their incomes during working
age; contributions are then adjusted to make means meet ends. In the other setting,
contributions are levied as a constant percentage of the income of the currently working;
pension beneﬁts emerge endogenously from the revenues thus raised.
Consider an economy of two overlapping generations where life cycles consist of one period
of work and one period of retirement. Assume that generations are equally populous.
Denoting by bt and pt−1, respectively, period-t contributions to the PAYG scheme per
capita of workers, and period-t pension payments to the retirees of generation t − 1, a
PAYG scheme is deﬁned by bt = pt−1. We analyze the following speciﬁcations:
• Generation t − 1’s pension pt−1 depends on that generation’s previous earnings
wt−1. In a linear speciﬁcation, pt−1 = α · wt−1 where α is the replacement ratio.
Contributions levied on those working emerge residually as bt = αwt−1; the implicit
contribution rate, thus, amounts to bt/wt = αwt−1/wt.
• Alternatively, contributions in t are raised as a ﬁxed percentage (the contribution
rate) β of workers’ income: bt = β · wt. Generation t − 1’s pensions then residually
result as pt−1 = β · wt; the implicit replacement ratio is pt−1/wt−1 = β · wt/wt−1.
We call the ﬁrst policy a ﬁxed replacement (FR) policy, and the second a ﬁxed contributions
(FC) policy. The distinction between these policies is akin to the deﬁned-beneﬁt/deﬁned-
contribution dichotomy in the context of private, funded pensions. In stochastic settings,
FR- and FC-policies perform diﬀerently with respect to intergenerational risk-sharing
(Thøgersen, 1998; Wagener, 2003). The FC/FR distinction also bears linkages to the
degree of intragenerational redistribution through the pension scheme: In Bismarckian
systems pensions are indexed to previous earnings (as with a FR policy) while they are
unrelated to previous earnings in Beveridgean schemes (as under a FC regime).
Prima facie, FR- and FC-policies look equivalent in models with identical agents if the
wage is time-invariant; then α = β represents both the contribution and the replacement
rate. (With population growth at rate n > −1, set α = β(1 + n).) It therefore seems
1perfectly justiﬁed to focus on one of the two policies, especially when one is interested
in steady state economies. Indeed, most contributions in the literature only analyse FC
schemes and do not even mention FR policies.1
Here we argue that the distinction between FR and FC PAYG policies might indeed
matter. In particular, equilibrium dynamics and stability properties of steady states
largely diﬀer under the two regimes. Technically, the equilibrium of an OLG economy
with a FR scheme is characterized by a diﬀerence equation of order two. This is due to
the fact that today’s pension contributions to the pension scheme depend on past rather
than on current wages. In contrast, with a FC policy the equilibrium is characterized by
a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation. Hence, while equilibrium dynamics with FC schemes do
not exhibit any surprising features, FR equilibrium dynamics are more colourful. Changes
in FR policies may expose the economy to periodic or unstable dynamics. Moreover, we
show that such peculiarities can occur under circumstances (namely, for high elasticities of
substitution in production) that would, without wage-related pension liabilities, not give
rise to bifurcations or endogenous cycles. The diﬀerences between FC and FR equilibria
are due to the endogeneity of the contribution rate under a FR scheme; this works to
magnify the eﬀects of changes in the capital-labour ratio on the rent-wage ratio.
Section 2 presents a standard 2-OLG economy with FR PAYG pensions and Section 3
analyzes and illustrates its equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 relates our observations to
the literature and compares them to a FC policy. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model and Equilibrium
We consider a Diamond-type 2-OLG model with capital accumulation (see Ihori, 1996,
for a survey). Generation t (t = 0,1,...) consists of Nt identical individuals each of whom
lives for the two periods t (youth) and t + 1 (old age). From t to t + 1 the population
grows by (the possibly negative) rate nt := Nt/Nt−1 − 1 > −1. We denote the life-cycle
utility function by U and assume that it is additively time-separable with instantaneous
utility functions u and ˆ u: Ut = u(c1,t) + ˆ u(c2,t). By c1,t and c2,t we denote consumption
of a member of generation t when young and old, respectively. Sub-utility functions are
well-behaved with ν0(c) > 0 > ν00(c) for all c > 0 and ν0(0) = ∞ for ν = u, ˆ u. To obtain
that savings increase in their rate of return we require that the marginal utility of old-age
1See, e.g., Burbidge (1983), Ihori (1996) or J¨ ager (1994). Even more widespread are, however, lump-
sum (rather than earnings-related) pension schemes. See, e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
2consumption decreases less than proportionally with consumption:
ˆ u
0(c) + cˆ u
00(c) > 0 for all c > 0. (1)
Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour during working age and is fully
retired during old-age. Hence, total labour supply in period t amounts to Nt.
The economy has available a time-invariant, aggregate neoclassical production technology
that employs inputs capital and labour with constant returns to scale. Per-worker output
in t then amounts to f(kt) with kt as the capital stock in period t divided by Nt. We
suppose that the production function f possesses the standard Inada properties: f(k) > 0,
f0(k) > 0, f00(k) < 0 for all k > 0 and f(0) = 0, f0(0) = ∞ and f0(∞) = 0.
We denote by st, bt, pt, wt, Rt, respectively, generation t’s per-capita savings, per-capita
social security taxes, per-capita old-age pensions, the net wage rate and the interest factor
that prevail in period t. Budget constraints for the two periods in the life of generation t
are then given by c1,t = wt − bt − st and c2,t = Rt+1 · st + pt. We concentrate on PAYG
schemes (i.e., (1 + nt)bt = pt−1) with a FR policy (for FC policies see Section 4.2). I.e.,
pt = α · wt and bt = αwt−1/(1 + nt).
Capital market equilibrium in period t requires total saving of the previous period to be
equal to capital demand in t:
st−1 = (1 + nt) · kt. (2)
Competitive proﬁt maximization requires ﬁrms to hire labour and capital such as to equate
marginal factor productivities and factor prices: f0(kt) = Rt and f(kt) − f0(kt) · kt = wt.
Individuals take factor prices and the parameters of the PAYG schemes as given. Utility
maximization entails equalizing the discounted periodwise marginal utilities of consump-
tion: u0(c1,t) = Rt+1ˆ u(c2,t). This implicitly deﬁnes generation t’s saving as a function of
the own wage rate, the interest factor, the replacement rate, and the wage rate of the
previous generation which enters via pension contributions: st = st(wt,wt−1,Rt+1,α).
• swt is ambiguous in sign due to a positive ﬁrst-period income eﬀect and a negative
second-period income eﬀect;
• swt−1 < 0: savings are lower the higher are past wages – which imply a higher
pension liability for current workers;
• sR > 0: savings increase in their rate of return, provided that (1) holds;
• sα < 0: savings decrease in the replacement rate α due to smaller disposable incomes
in working age and higher retirement incomes.
3Plugging the (appropriately lagged) factor price relations and the savings function into the
equilibrium condition (2) for the capital market, we can summarize equilibrium dynamics
under a FR regime in the following second-order diﬀerence equation:
(1 + n)kt+1 − s(f(kt) − ktf
0(kt),f(kt−1) − kt−1f
0(kt−1),f
0(kt+1),α) = 0. (3)
Existence of equilibrium (i.e., a solution for (3)) can be established under fairly general as-
sumptions (see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1991), which are met here. A stationary
state for the dynamics of (3) is a level ¯ k such that:
(1 + n) · ¯ k = s
￿
f(¯ k) − ¯ k · f





One – uninteresting – ﬁxed point of (4) is given by ¯ k = 0. In what follows we will discuss
positive steady states with ¯ k > 0 only.
3. Stability Analysis
3.1 General Observations
Eq. (3) being of order two, the stability analysis proves a bit tricky. We use the “geomet-
rical” method developed in Azariadis (1993) and Grandmont et al. (1998).2 Along with
the substitution kt =: xt−1 we rewrite (3) as a dynamic system xt = G(kt−1,xt−1) and



















swt · f00(kt) · kt





swt−1 · f00(kt−1) · kt−1
1 + n − sR · f00(kt+1)
< 0. (6)
The sign of the second term comes from sR > 0 > swt−1, the sign of the ﬁrst one is unclear.









where all the derivatives have to be evaluated at ¯ k. The discriminant of φ, D = G2
k+4Gx,
can take any sign. Hence, J may have complex eigenvalues; equilibria may thus be peri-
odic. Moreover, the positions of the eigenvalues of J relative to the unit circle are unclear,
2For recent applications see Koskela et al. (2000), Aloi et al. (2000) or Coimbra et al. (2000).
4too. Hence, equilibria may be stable or not. Furthermore, upon changes of the replace-
ment rate α (possibly also of other parameters of the model) there may be bifurcations of
diﬀerent types, including period-doubling Hopf bifurcations . I.e., by slightly changing a
parameter of the model, qualitative changes in the dynamic properties of the equilibrium
trajectories nearby the steady state may occur. We illustrate this in a numerical example.
3.2 An Example
Let utility be Cobb-Douglas and production technology be CES:




with parameters A > 0, a ∈ (0,1), η ≤ 1 and η 6= 0. The elasticity of substitution in


















It is plausible to assume α ≤ Rt+1; hence, ∂s/∂wt ≥ 0. Furthermore, ∂s/∂wt−1 < 0 <
∂s/∂Rt+1 for α > 0, as expected. By an appropriate choice of A, we adapt units of
measurement such that ¯ k = 1 in the steady state. Then,
¯ R = (1 + a)
1/η−1 and ¯ w =
1
a
· (1 + a)
1/η−1.
We index the economy by the replacement rate and write all expressions as functions of



















which has characteristic polynomial φ(λ,α) = λ2 + λGk(α) − Gx(α) and discriminant
D(α) = G2
k(α) + 4Gx(α). We set n = 0. By appropriately choosing the free parameters
we can generate a large variety of stability patterns: ﬁxed and periodic points both with
contracting and expanding directions. We illustrate this for η = 0.25 and a = 0.4.
Figure 1 goes here.
The dotted arrow in Fig. 1 shows what happens when α varies from 0 to closely below 1:3
3The precise values of the boundary points for the numerical speciﬁcation chosen are: α1 = 0.198,
α2 = 0.259, and α3 = 0.621. Calculations have been made in a Mathematica notebook that is available
from the author.
5• 0 < α < α1: Here we have D(α) > 0 (real eigenvalues) and φ(1,α) < 0 (eigenvalues
on diﬀerent sides of +1); furthermore g(α) > 0. Hence, the steady state is a saddle.
• α1 < α < α2: Eigenvalues are still real (since D(α) > 0), but now are both
positive and fall on the same side of both +1 and −1. Hence, the steady state is
asymptotically stable.
• α2 < α < α3: Eigenvalues are complex and come as a conjugate pair. As detJ(α) <
1, the oscillatory orbits in the neighbourhood of the steady state are stable spirals.
• α3 < α < 1: Eigenvalues are complex. Since detJ(α) > 1, we obtain unstable
spirals near to the steady state.
For α = α1, a saddle-node bifurcation occurs (there is one eigenvalue of modulus one and
|detJ| < 1), and for α = α3 we detect a Hopf bifurcation (an invariant closed curve in
the neighbourhood of the steady state).4 Summing up, we get
Result 1 In an economy with FR pensions equilibria may be periodic and unstable. Small
changes in the replacement rate may lead to drastic changes in the system’s orbit structure
and dynamic behaviour.
4. Discussion and Comparison
4.1 Bifurcations and the Elasticity of Substitution
While saddle-node bifurcations are quite common in planar dynamical models with some
sort of debt (see Azariadis (1993) for several examples), Hopf bifurcations are rarer. They
can occur in many-good OLG models (Grandmont, 1985) and are not new in one-good,
Diamond-type OLG models either; see, e.g., Farmer (1986), Reichlin (1986), or Azariadis
(1993). Typically, however, they emerge at low values of the elasticity of substitution in
production, in particular for values well below unity (i.e., for η < 0 in CES functions):
4Application of the Hopf bifurcation theorem requires several conditions to be met at once (Azariadis,
1993, Theorem 8.5): The dynamic mappings that give rise to the Jacobian J must be Ck for some k ≥ 6.
This is satisﬁed here, since in the relevant range all functions are smooth. The steady state must be a
non-hyperbolic equilibrium at α3, and there must be a conjugate pair of complex eigenvalues λ(α3) of
modulus 1. This is exactly what detJ(α3) = 1 means. Furthermore λk(α) 6= 1 for k = 1,2,3,4, which is
also satisﬁed. Finally, d|λ(α3)|/dα 6= 0, which can be visually veriﬁed by plotting the graph of g(α).
6Reichlin (1986) discusses the Leontief case, and in Farmer (1986)’s example for the CES-
case Hopf bifurcations occur only when technologies exhibit lower factor substitutability
than Cobb-Douglas functions.
In the example presented above, we ﬁnd Hopf bifurcations for elasticities of substitution
well above unity, which may be regarded as the empirically more relevant case. They
originate from opposing eﬀects of higher wages in diﬀerent periods on saving. In standard
models, higher wages will stimulate saving which, in a growing economy, will promote
capital accumulation, further raise the wages and lower the interest rate. With FR pen-
sions there is, however, a negative eﬀect on saving which runs counter to this process:
High wages today mean high pension liabilities for the subsequent generation — which
will depress their saving. Eventually, the dynamic growth process might reverse itself.
Result 2 In an economy with a FR PAYG pension scheme, endogenous cycles and bi-
furcations may occur even when the elasticity of substitution in production is above unity.
4.2 FR- versus FC-policies
Contrast these observations with the case of FC pensions. The FC analogue to eq. (3) is
(1 + n)kt+1 − ˆ s(f(kt) − ktf
0(kt),f(kt+1) − kt+1f
0(kt+1),f
0(kt+1),β) = 0, (7)
where ˆ s = ˆ s(wt,wt+1,Rt+1,β) emerges from utility maximization, maxst[u(wt(1 − β) −
st) + ˆ u(Rt+1st + (1 + nt+1)βwt+1)].
Result 3 In an economy with FC pensions equilibrium dynamics are monotonic. Fur-
thermore, the steady state is stable if capital income increases with the capital stock:
f
0(k) + k · f
00(k) ≥ 0 for all k > 0. (8)





1 + n + f00(kt+1) ·
￿
ˆ swt+1kt+1 − ˆ sR
￿
(see Galor and Ryder, 1989; Azariadis, 1993). Uniqueness of the steady state and mono-
tonicity of dynamics will hold when dkt+1/dkt > 0. This provided, stability of the steady
state will prevail whenever dkt+1/dkt < 1.5 It can easily be shown that ˆ swt > 0, ˆ swt+1 < 0,
5Precisely, stability will prevail if −1 < dkt+1/dkt < 1. The case −1 < dkt+1/dkt < 0 (which cannot
occur here) is problematic; see J¨ ager (1994) for a discussion.
7ˆ sR > 0, and ˆ swt+1kt+1 − ˆ sR < 0. Hence, dkt+1/dkt > 0. Now we evaluate dkt+1/dkt in
the steady state. Invoking these intermediate results one gets that dkt+1/dkt < 1 for
kt+1 = kt = ¯ k is equivalent to
￿
(1 + n) − f
00¯ k(1 − β)
￿
u










This always holds as the LHS is negative while the RHS is positive, given (8). ￿
The dynamics of the economy with a FC PAYG scheme are, thus, well-behaved, compared
to those under a FR scheme: They are monotonic and never exhibit endogenous cycles
or bifurcations.6 The diﬀerence between FC and FR schemes traces back to eqs. (3) and
(7): The former diﬀerence equation is of order two, the latter of order one.
4.3 Increasing the Replacement Rate
The higher the contribution rate in a FC scheme, the lower is the steady-state capital
stock; see, e.g., Burbidge (1983) and Azariadis (1993, ch. 18). What does happen in a FR





1 + n + f00(¯ k)
￿
−sR + swt¯ k + swt−1¯ k
￿ (9)
with sα < 0. Without further restrictions the sign of the denominator in (9) is unclear.
It is therefore conceivable that increasing α raises the capital stock. However, we show
Result 4 If the steady state is stable for α = 0, then introducing a small FR scheme
depresses the capital stock: d¯ k/dα < 0.
Proof: For α = 0 we are in a standard laissez-faire OLG economy without pensions.
Galor and Ryder (1989) show that the conditions for a unique and globally stable steady
state (characterized by ¯ k0) include dkt+1/dkt < 1. This is equivalent to 1 + n + f00(¯ k0) ·
(−sR + swt¯ k0) > 0 here. Taking into account that swt−1 < 0 for α > 0 while swt−1 = 0 for
α = 0, the denominator in (9) is positive for small positive values of α. ￿
6This only holds for perfect-foresight equilibria (where individuals correctly anticipate future interest
and wage rates). With myopic foresight, equilibria might be oscillatory and exhibit deterministic stable
cycles (Michel and de la Croix, 2000).
85. Conclusion
We analyzed economic dynamics in an OLG model with capital accumulation and PAYG
social security schemes. Unlike the literature, which concentrates on pension policies with
constant contribution rates, our focus was on pension policies with a ﬁxed replacement
ratio. Our results are the following: (i) Equilibrium dynamics diﬀer considerably between
economies with FC and FR pensions. (ii) With FR pensions, equilibria may be periodic
and unstable, prompting endogenous cycles and bifurcations. (iii) With FR pensions,
bifurcations might even occur when the elasticity of substitution in production is high.
The distinction between FR- and FC-policies currently ﬁgures prominently on the pension
reform agenda. While PAYG schemes throughout the world traditionally are of the FR-
type, several countries recently switched to a FC scheme (e.g., Sweden) or at least moved
into that direction (e.g., Italy, Germany). Latvia and Poland chose the FC option when
newly designing their pension system in the late 1990s. While (to our knowledge) so far
no empirical comparison of the dynamic stability of the two PAYG options is available,
our analysis indicates that addressing that issue in pension studies might be worthwile.
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Figure 1: Characteristics of stability (n = 0; η = 0.25; a = 0.4)
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